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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

1

Act of U. S. 1862, c. 119-License to sell Liquor-State Laws.---A
license granted under St. of U. S. of 1862, c. 119, does not authorize the
sale of intoxicating liquors in this Commonwealth, in violation of the
statutes of this Commonwealth: Commonwealth vs. Thorniley.
.Promissory Note-Payable in Specie-Recoveri under.-The plaintiff
in an action upon a promissory note payable on demand in specie can only
recover judgment f6r the amount of the face of the note and interest
thereon, although he offers to prove that at the time when payment of the
note was demanded, specie was worth a premium above par: Wood vs.
Bullens.
Arbitrators-Awardof Transfer of specific PersonalProperly.-Arbitrators under a statute submission have no authority to award that one of
the parties shall transfer to the other a specific article of personal property:
Brown vs. Evans.
An award by arbitrators under a statute submission that one of the
parties shall recover of the other a certain sum of money, and transfer to
him a specific article of personal property, is wholly invalid: Id.
I

From Charles Allen, Esq., to appear in Vol. VI. of his Reports.
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Will-Claim by Widow waiving Provisionsof Rusband's Will-Assets
computing the amount of a widow's share in the
estate of her husband, under Statute 1861, ch. 161, upon her waiving the
provisions of his will in her behalf, promissory notes held by him at the
time of his death, and given by him in his will to the makers thereof, are
to bzc regarded as assets; and the personal property is to be estimated at
its value at the time of distribution: Plympton vs. Plympton et al.
If a testator bequeaths the income of certain property to his wife so
long as she lives and remains his widow, for the support of herself and
her two children, and she waives the provisions of the will in her behalf,
the two children are entitled to the whole of such income during the time
specified: id.
If a testator who bequeaths the income of certain property to his wife,
so long as she lives and remains his widow, for the support of herself and
her two children, and appoints her guardian of said children, provides
also that during that time no change in any investment shall be made
without her consent, her waiver of the provisions of the will inher behalf
does not give to the trustees of the property the right to change investments without her consent: Id.
-Constructon.-In

Afunicipal Corporation-PaymentofExpenses in procuringits ChaurterProcuring of Legislation not a legal Consideration for Contract.-Under
St. 1847, c. 87, this court have jurisdiction in equity, upon a proper case
being made, to compel the restoration of money, with interest thereon, to
the treasury of a town, which has been taken therefrom and applied to
illegal purposes by officers of the town, under a vote of a majority of the
inhabitants thereof: Frostet al. vs. Belmont et al.
A town has no authority to appropriate money for the payment' of expenses incurred by individuals, prior to its corporate existence as a town,
in procuring the passage of its charter: Id.
Services rendered in procuring the passage of an act of legislation by
means of secret attempts to secure votes, or sinister or personal influences
upon members, are not a legal consideration for a contract: Id.
In taxing costs for counsel fees, to be paid out of a fund in controversy,
the court will not allow all charges which may be proper in a particular
case, as between counsel and client, but will refer as a general guide to
the compensation usually paid to public officers for services of a similar
character: Id.
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NEW YORK SURROGATE COURTS.

1

.etters of Administration-Applicationfor, by Persons not having the
Prior Right.-The provision of the Statute 3 Rev. Stat. 5th ed. 160,
6 35, providing that where an application for administration is made by a
person other than the one having the prior right, the applicant shall file
a written renunciation of persons having such prior right' or a citation
shall be issued to such persons to show cause,-must be construed
strictly. Nothing will satisfy the statute but a written renunciation, or a
citation to show cause: Barber vs. Converse.
Thus, where letters of administration were granted to D. B. and A. B.,
who had the prior right, but were revoked on their failure to give new securities, and. letters were subsequently granted to C., who was next entitled
fa them: Hedd, that D. B. and A. B. were entitled to notice of the ap
plication of C. The failure of D. B. and A. B. to furnish new sureties,
does not amount to a "written renunciation,"within the meaning of the
statute; nor does the previous notice or citation served on them to
appear and. file new sureties, dispense with the necessity of service of a
citation on them, upon C.'s application: Id.
Where letters of administraiion have been irregularly issued, without
citing those having a prior 'right to the administration, they will be
revoked: Id."

Will.-Absence of Attesting Witness from t e State.--Mere absence of
an attesting witness from the state, abroad on a journey or tour, does not
authorize proof of the will by proving the handwriting of the testator and
of the witness. To entitle such testimony to be given, the witness must
reside out of the state: Stow vs. Stow.
The statute providing for such proof, where all or any of the" witnesses
': reside" out of the state (3 Rev. Stat. 5th ed. 139, 140, §§ §, 12), imports
sometl'ing more than mere absence from the state. The word should be
taken in its broadest legal signification, and means actual residence without regard to the domicil : Id.
Will- Want of Mental Capacity-Failureof Memory-Influence.Where no failure of memory was exhibited at the time the will was
executed, and the testator is not shown to have had any disease of the
I To appear in a forthcoming volume of Surrogate Court Reports, by Amass A.
of New York.

Redfield, Esq.,
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brain which permanently impaired his mental faculties: Beld, that the
facts of his old age, declining health, and his failure to recollect or un-.
derstand certain transactions, do not prove a want of mental capacity to
make a will: Clarke vs. Davis.
A statement made by the testator, after the execution of a codicil, to a
daughter whom he had therein disinherited, that he had given her the
sum of $600, and no such sum appeared in the will: Reld, not sufficient
to prove a want of capacity. The capacity of a testator to make a will
must be determined by what happened at its execution, and not what
afterwards occurred: ITd.
The influence to vitiate an act must amount to force and coercion,
destroying free agency. It must not be the influence of affection and
attachment, nor the. desire of gratifying the wishes of another. The
proof must be that the act was obtained by coercion; by importunity
that could not be resisted; that it was done merely for the sake of peace,
so that the motive was tantamount to force and fear. The natural influence of a wife, arising from her relations with the testator, without proof
of any specific acts, will not amount to such coercion : Id.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.'

Mandamus-Issueof PeremptoryWrit stayed on suggestion of Collusion.
-- Where the return of a register of deeds to an alternative writ, of
mandamus to compel him to hold his office at a place alleged to lbe the
county seat, according to the result of a certain election, was adjudged
insufficient on demurrer, and the' relator having moved for a peremptory
writ, the clerk of the court of the -same county presented affidavits alleging
collusion between the relator and the register, and that similar suits had
been commenced against other officers of that county to test the same
question, in which issues of fact had been joined, it was held, that pro.
ceedings in the action against the register should be stayed until the
further order of the court after a trial of the issues of fact should have
been had: State of Wisconsin ex rel. Field vs. Avery.
Such a suit is not to be treated as a mere private one, inasmuch as it
presents a question of public importance, and one which ought not to be
decided one way in one suit and differently in another, thus establishing
two county seats: .
From P. L. Spooner, Esq., State Reporter. To appear in Vol. XV. of Wisconsin Reports
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nstitutional Law- Witnesses-Farm Mortgages.-An act of the

legislature requiring the reference of actions to foreclose the so-called
farm mortgages, to some person to be named by the court, who should
take all the testimony to be taken in the state, which either party might
desire to use on the trial, is unconstitutional, since it deprives the party of
his constitutional right to have his witnesses examined in open court:
Oatman vs. Bond, impleaded, &c.
An act of the legislature which discloses in all its provisions an intention so to interpose obstacles and delays in the way of dnforcing the class
of mortgages therein referred to (farm mortgages, so-called), as to leave
the creditor without any substantial remedy, impairs the obligation of

contracts, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States,
and of the state of Wisconsin, and is, therefore, inoperative and void.
Per Corm, 3.: Id.

. Such an act is also invalid under the clause of the Wisconsin Bill of
Rights, which affirms, that "every person is entitled to a certain remedy
in the laws for all injuries or wrongs, which he may receive in his person,
property, or character," &c. Per PAINE, J.: Id.
(onditutional Law-Tax-City Oarter.-Where the charter of a

city, at the time of the issue and sale of its bonds, made it the duty of the
Common Council, when any judgment should be rendered against the
city, to levy and collect the amount like any other city or ward charges,
and declared that private property should not be taken on execution to
pay any city debt, a subsequent act of the legislature prohibiting the city
from levying such a tax as would be necessary to discharge a judgment
rendered against it for interest on said bonds, would deprive the creditor
of the only efficient means of collecting his debt, and would be repugnant
to the constitution: State of 7isconsin ex reL Soutler vs. Te Common
Council of Mad.ison.

The duty of the Common Council of the city issuing such bonds to
levy a tax to meet them, or the interest on them, is continuing, and does
not cease with the levying of one tax which is in part uncollected. It ends
only when the money is collected, and the debt is actually paid: Id.
It makes no difference in such a case, that the judgment against the
city was rendered by a court of the United States; the court will award
a mandamus to compel the Common Council of the city to levy and collect
a tax for the payment of such a judgment; and if the Mayor and a part of
the Common Council should go out of office after the alternative writ is

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS

served, their duties in the premises would devolve on their successors, and
the peremptory writ be directed to and enforced upon the Mayor and
Common Council generally: Id.
Statute of Limitations.-The decision in Parkervs. Kane, 4 Wise. R.
1, that an action may be barred by a statute of limitations passed after the
cause of action accrued, if a sufficient and reasonable portion of tle time
of limitation, within which the bill might have been filed, remained after
the enactment of the sthtute, cited and approved: Howell vs. Howell.
Judge's Salary assignabe-Estoppel-Mandamusto State Treasurer.The salary of a judge, to become due, is a possibility coupled with an
interest, and, as such, capable of being assigned: State ex rel. State
Bank vs. Hastings.
A circuit judge delivered to the Iowa County Bank, on the 3d of August.
his order upon the treasurer of state, directing him to pay to said bank,
or order, on the 1st of October following, a certain sum "in full for my
(his) quarter's salary commencing on that day," the order being drawn
without value, and intended by the parties as a mere authority to the bank
to receivd and hold the money for the judge's use. The Iowa County
Bank indorsed the order, for full value, before maturity, to the State Bank,
which purchased it without any notice of the rights of the drawer, except
such as is to be implied from the order itself. Held, that the drawer,
after having, by proper documentary evidence of title, clothed the Iowa
County Bank with the apparent ownership of the fund, is estopped, as to
bondfide purchasers for value, from asserting that such apparent ownership was not the real ownership: Id.
The state treasurer having refused to pay said order, on the ground that
its payment was countermanded by the circuit judge, the court awarded a
mandamus to compel its payment, it appearing that he had sufficient funds
in his hands applicable to that purpose: Id.
Constitutional Law- Compensationfor Lands flowed by Milltdam.An act of the legislature authorizing proprietors of a mill-dam to flow lands
of other persons, without any provision for compensation, except that they
should pay the landowners the value of the land, to be ascertained by
the verdict in an action of trespass, is in violation of that section of the
,onstitution which forbids the taking of private property for public use
without making compensation therefor: Newellvs. Smith.
A person who purchases land already flowed in consequence of a dam,
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and for which no compensation in gross has ever been made, may recover
for injury done to the land by the maintenance of the dam after he purchased the estate: Id.
Common Carrier-Negligence-ConditioninBillofLadng.-Whethex

a common carrier can limit or evade his common law liability by an express contract, gure : Falvey vs. N. Tr. Campany.
Where a condition that the owner of goods assumed the risk of loss by
lake navigation and damages from unavoidable or accidental delay, was
contained in a bill of lading delivered to the shipper in New York, but
the owner of the goods lived in Wisconsin, and there was no proof that
he ever assented to or had any knowledge of such condition, the court
would hardly feel authorized to say that .there was a a special contract
between the parties, by which the owner agreed to take any risk which
the law would otherwise impose upon the carrier: Id.
Where the goods mentioned in such bill of lading were delivered to a
transportation company in the city of New York on the 10th of November, to be carried to a port in Wis~ongin, by steam on the lakes, and the
goods were not received at Buffalo until the 22d or 28d; though tho
usual time for transporting goods between those cities by such company
was only about three days; and a few hlirs after leaing Buffalo, the
vessel on which the goods were put was wrecked and the goods lost:
Held, that the delay in transporting the goods to Buffalo, was, in view of
the increased dangers of lake navigation as winter approached, prima
facie proof of negligence, and cast upo the company the burden of
showing that the delay was fairly within the exception contained in the
bill of lading: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW IHAMPSHIRE.

1

Easement-Mill-dam-Presumptionof Grant-Eguity-Demur.erfor
want of Equity-Nuisance---Jurisdiction.-Ifthe owner of the land on

one side of a river erects a mill-dam across the river and abuts the same
upon the opposite shore, and continues and maintains the same for twenty
years in that position, that would be evidence of a grant or right to build
and maintain such a dam, constructed and used substantially in the same
manner: Burnham vs. Kempton.

But it is not evidence of a right to approximate all the water-power that
I For these notes of very recent decisions we are indebted to the kindness cf the
judges.
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might be created by such dam to the use of the person who thus built and
maintained the dam: Id.
A dam is an instrument for turning water to the use of a mill, as a
bulkhead is the means of drawing the water from a dam, but neither may
in fact have been used for either purpose at all, or if at all, in any suck
a way as to change or affect the original rights of the riparian owners on
either side : .d.
Twenty years use of the water of a stream in a particular way is evi
dence of a right thus to use the water: Id.
The same proof of user which establishes the right is equally conclusive
in establishing the limitation of that right: Id
Want of equity is not only good ground of demurrer to a bill, but is a
good ground of defence where no case is established upon the merfts, and
this includes cases where the plaintiffs right proves to be one at law and
not one in equity: Id.
Ordinarily courts of equity will exercise a concurrent jurisdiction with
courts of law in cases of private nuisance, only when they can restrain
irreparable mischief, suppress interminable litigation, or prevent a multiplicity of suits: Id.
And in such cases courts of equity will not ordinarily take upon themselves to decide the fact, that a nuisance exists, when that fact is controverted, but will require that the party asking the interference of the court
shall first establish his right at law: Id.
But in some casei, where the party has been long in the quiet and uninterrupted enjoyment of a right,, or where the injury threatened would be
irreparable, another party will be restrained from interfering with that
right, or doing that injury, until he establishes his right at law: Id.
Nor does that large class of cases involving an inquiry into the rights
of- the owners of water-power in connection with mills and machinery,
stand upon grounds substantially different in these respects, from other
cases of private nuisance : Id.
Where the rights of several owners in the same water-power or privilege
are admitted or have been established at law, a court of equity will entertain jurisdiction to regulate the use of the water, and to fix and establish
the extent of their respective rights so as to give each proprietor or owner
the just proportion of water to which he is entitled : Id.
But a court of equity will not entertain jurisdiction of a cause, under
any pretence of adjusting rights in common to water-power, where it is
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apparent that all that is sought by the parties or either of them, is to settle
and establish a disputed right, for the establishing of which the partier
have a plain and perfect remedy at law: Burnham vs. Kempton.
Statute of Limitations-Absence from the State-The Provision
applies to those who have never been Residents of the State-The Statute
does not belog to the Law of the Place of Contract, but of Remedy.-The

provisions of the Statute of Limitations that 11if the defendant at the time
the cause of action.accrued or afterwards, was absent from and residing
out of the state, the time of such absence shall be excluded in the computation of the several times before limited for the commencement of
personal actions," applies to defendants who have never resided in the
state, as well as to those who have once resided in it and have removed
from it: Paine et al. vs. Drew.

Citizens of other states are allowed to sue in our courts upon the same
ground on which our own citizens stand, and with the same rights in the
application of the remedy that the latter possess : Id.
Therefore a citizen of the state of Maine suing a citizen of Massachusetts in our courts, and the court having acquired jurisdiction of the
parties by legal service upon defendant, the Statute of Limitations is-not
available as a defence in any other manner than as though the plaintiff
was a citizen of this state : I.
Ordinarily the Statute of Limitations of a state does not in any way
attach its, If to or affect the contract; it is no part of the lea loai contrac.
tus, but if affects and limits the remedy merely, and belongs purely to the
lb fori: Id.
Hence, such a statute does not operate as a discharge of a contract or
as a defence against the contract itself, but is interposed as a bar to the
maintenance of an action; it limits the time within which the remedy must
be pursued or applied : Id.
An action may be maintained in our courts, when not barred by our
Statute of Limitations, upon a contract made in another state, though an
action thereon may be barred by the statute of the state where the contract was made and was to be performed: Id.
Easement-rrant of Right of Wayj-Reserved Rights of Grantor.-

Nothing pasvqr as incident to the grant of an easement but that which is
necessary for its reasonable and proper enjoyment: Bean vs. Coleman
The grant of a private pass-way or right of way over a portion of the
grantor's land, without any reservation of the right to erect bars or gates

